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Introduction
Before any clear understanding can be gained concerning the current proliferation of the term 
“dispositive”, it is necessary to show the problematic in whose context such a term could make 
sense. The first issue, that still predominates the discussions of this term, appears in the pre-
understanding of representation in contrast to presentation. This issue appears not only in mass 
media, but also in such theoretical concerns as are offered by deconstructionists and postmod-
ernists. Claims are made that the Western tradition assumed logocentric position based on pres-
ence of the given. The effort, then, is to argue that there is no presence; if this is granted, then 
there is no representation and thus, by extension, no misrepresentation. One cannot claim that 
some minorities, or some gender were misrepresented – after all, they were never present. We 
shall return to this issue after discussing the origin of the rise of representation. The latter is a 
result of modern metaphysical speculations in contrast to the classical traditions that had con-
ceived of the world as unavoidably given – present. A theory – theorea – dealt with the presence 
of some reality, some being. The condition for this presence is the mode of thinking wherein 
all the things, events, social customs, cultural designs were regarded from a limit – peras. If one 
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can delimit the limits of something, if one can decipher the boundaries of events and things, 
then one has their presence. One of the ways of speaking about presence as seen from the limit 
is essence. Theorea is a way of capturing this essence, indeed, theorea is an embodiment of the 
essence by other means. This is to say, theorea does not represent the given; it is the very pres-
ence of the given. The difference between the two – presentation and representation – is also 
the difference in the notion of creativity.
1. The present and the mediated
The argument for the presence – and its expression as essence, is restricted where even the 
kirios on, the most revered, is seen from the limit, even if the limit is nothing. In principle, 
Classicism saw all from a limit, and hence could create both material forms and formal 
precisions. The latter too were discovered as given. Even the unlimited, the apeiron – was 
compelled to emerge in some form, in a given parameter. If one regards Platonism, one 
notes immediately that the “ideas” as reality par excellence, comprise absolute limits, forms, 
to the chaotic flux, to the multiplicity of givens (Plato, 2010). Indeed, the latter must respect 
the limits of the forms in order to be. Even if one regards Aristotelian naturalism, with its 
seemingly unconstructed dynamis, one also notes that the dynamis is given only in a specific 
substantial form, comprising a limit (Aristotle, 2008). Even in an extreme interpretation, 
where the dynamis may be regarded as completely formless “process”, one discovers it to 
have a telos which contains all the forms and toward which the dynamis unfolds and thus 
obtains its limits dictated by the “thoughts” in the final cause. In brief, whether one regards 
the two extremes, Platonic “idealism” or Aristotelian “naturalism”, as expressions of Classi-
cism, one finds an unavoidable presence provided by a limit and its hermeneutical diversity. 
In principle, presence does not require representation to the extent that all things, indeed 
being itself, the entire cosmos, is accessible and understandable within limits. Greek creativ-
ity was classical, within recognizable forms, and thus classical. They created “ideal” classical 
figures to which humans hat to aspire in their own life. Even the creation of the essence of 
society had to be ideal in which people had to aim at “beautiful” behavior. Given this con-
text, representation could not be a serious issue and resultantly neither deconstruction nor 
postmodernity could make sense in the classical context.
It is quite otherwise with modern thinking. The given is not directly present. The ground 
of this rests in a unique honoring of being: in order to be regarded as most worthy, being was 
conceived to be positively infinite and, to lend glory and power to this infinity, it had to be 
regarded as a creator of an infinite world – not unlimited, but positively infinite world. This 
radical reconceptualization provides a series of implications. First, it is in principle impossible 
to have a presence of infinity, to contain it within a theory. No articulation of events – one 
after another or in sum could make infinity present. Resultantly, one must have representa-
tions that, regardless of their extent, cannot offer the presence of the universe. Second, if 
the universe is regarded to be infinite, then any point one picks can be deemed its center. 
Every calculation from a chosen center will be correct, but not a presence of the universe. 
In this sense, we may have many and sundry representations, none of which, and neither 
their sum, are adequate to give the presence of the universe. This shift toward a selection of 
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any possible point as a center is the source of the Copernican Revolution, and a possibility 
of creative construction of multiple theories. Third, every chosen point comprises a specific 
perspective. The latter, as positional, represents the positions of others and itself only because 
it cannot present the universe. Any shift of perspective, recreates other perspectives in novel 
ways. Fourth, given such a position the perspective is all there is of the universe. After all, 
one cannot find a universe, specifically if it is infinite, and then take a perspective to it. In 
this sense, perspective means the very world one has, and the latter is created and constantly 
recreated. One cannot leave the world, and then take a perspective to it. If perspective is a 
representation, then the representation is all that one has as a world. Fifth, this notion of 
perspectivity has been extended to the conception of world view. There may be a scientific 
world view, a theological one, a metaphysical, ontological, ethical, and even aesthetic world 
views. None allow for presence of the cosmos, and hence each is a created representation 
wherein the latter is the very world one lives. Yet it must not be assumed that somehow the 
sum of the world views would offer us the presence of an infinite cosmos. This is excluded 
on two counts: first, a finite enumeration of world views will not make the infinite universe 
present; second, each world view, as positional, locates itself by representing other positions 
as different, and hence through the difference represents its own position. Yet each position 
will read the positions of others precisely as the position requires.
There is hardly a need to extend our analyses of these representational-positional multi-
plicities into their various modifications, such as Louis Althusser’s multiple discourses, each 
reading all other discourses in terms of a specific one, i.e. representing them precisely as a 
given discourse requires (2005). The same can be said of philosophical hermeneutics, wherein 
a philosophical thesis will represent all other theses in terms of its own logic or a frame of inter-
pretation. What is relevant in principle is the understanding that representations do not offer a 
presence of the world, but mutual differentiation of finite positionalities, with an open horizon 
of possibilities to create other positions. Finite, because there is no infinite positionality in 
principle, i.e. a priori impossible and hence a creation of other positions is left open. Represen-
tation cannot offer the position of other representations without regarding them from its own 
position. Thus the notion that some position misrepresents other positions loses its relevance. 
But this suggests that misrepresentation also falls by wayside. Jean Baudrillard’s simulacrum 
becomes redundant (1983). It still pretends to uphold a world that is no longer available. The 
same can be suggested of Jürgen Habermas’ notion concerning epistemic claims as dependent 
on a position of interest (1968). Any theory that claims to have a truth function due to “facts”, 
is comprehensible if the interest position is understood. Equally relevant would be the claims of 
“discursive” practice theorists, including Martin Heidegger’s notion that every discourse reads 
all other discourses in terms of a preunderstanding of a given tradition (1962). Even philo-
sophical hermeneutics confirms this: any theoretical position interprets other positions in terms 
of its own frame and, indeed, cannot help but do that.
2. Mediations
The battle concerning the “unmediated mediation” takes the following forms. If one deems 
awareness to be the ground of all world understanding, i.e. as the founding or unmediated 
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medium, one must speak and hence discover that one’s awareness is mediated, and neces-
sarily so by a polycentric field which includes not only the “sense” of oneself, but also of 
other subjects. Modern Western subject was born with the positing of material-mechanistic 
universe and with it a mind that contains thoughts, sensations and feelings which do not exist 
in the “objective” universe. Yet it is also the case that the subject or, more broadly, the Self, is 
always given as the background of all theoretical postulates and hence seems to be the final 
medium. Yet a question that immediately arises is that of the subject or, more broadly, Self 
and Other. After all, communication is with the Other, under the assumption that we are not 
some entity encased in our subjective interiority – solipsistic – inaccessible to the Other – as 
would be the case with Cartesian solipsism and basic empiricism. And yet the very awareness 
of Self makes sense only in its difference from and correlation to the Other. If our concern 
is with the modern Western notion of an Ego then, at this level of awareness, it is glimpsed 
immediately as a reflected Self. After all, even René Descartes (1985) requires a Self which, 
while reflecting, assumes an Ego different from the reflecting Self – the Ego is already the 
Other. Thus, the Self is always mediated by the Other, forming an awareness which can be 
extended through numerous others showing the limits of the Self, its difference from Others 
and yet an extension of its awareness through the different Others. The Ego marks a distance 
between the broader Self and its Other, posited in modern philosophies as Ego. In their static 
identifiability, the latter refer to the flux enacted by the Self, and exhibits a characteristic that 
is different and exclusive of the Self. This suggests that the Self cannot be exhausted by an 
identifiable act that is symbolized as an Ego. And yet the Ego is present as a reflected Self 
prior to an act of reflection. The Self recognizes in the Ego one of its possible acts. The sense 
of the Ego is the notion of Other, different from the Self.
The world is experienced in a polycentric way, where the Self is not only aware of some-
thing, but is aware of its limitation and expansion through the awareness of Others – thus 
an open horizon that is the very depth of both social interaction and history. The singular 
being, with her perspective regards herself as all encompassing: this is the way that the whole 
universe looks. Yet encountered Others have a different perspective, providing a reflective 
moment to see her own limitations and also to position herself “from there” as another 
intentionality. The Other shows both her limitations and at the same time opens her to 
more than her own intentionality had allowed. She sees with the Other’s vision. The entire 
modern pedagogical system is founded on the notion that we access the understanding of 
the world by “borrowing” the perceptions of others (we stand on the shoulders of giants). 
The borrowing and, in principle, extension of one’s own awareness of… includes the Oth-
ers whose awareness of… are inscribed in texts, in libraries, in archives, and in stories, in 
pedagogy, and in daily discourses. One sees with the theory of Isaac Newton (2010), Max 
Planck (1969), Aristotle (2008), with the intentional orientation of Thomas Mann (1995), Leo 
Tolstoy (1994), Fyodor Dostoevsky (2002) with The Brothers Karamazov (in Russian: Brat’ya 
Karamazovy, first edition in 1879–1880), Bhagavad Gita (2007, in Sanskrit: bhagavad-gītā), 
Electra (Sophocles, 2008, in Greek: Ēlektra), the Bible, and Friedrich Nietzsche (1974). One 
forms a polycentric awareness whose presence is not yet temporalized, yet whose field is 
continuously extending, leading to an all-encompassing regard that the universe is acces-
sible to the sum of all possible perspectives or intentionalities. Such a task is infinite, and it 
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is present poly-centrically to every perspective. Yet it is to be emphasized that it is not yet 
historical memory, but an extension of awareness through Others that subsequently can be 
interpreted as memory, historical past and tradition. Awareness constitutes itself in an inter 
reflectivity between positional egos and between its own intentional perspectivity. All this 
is most relevant to understand the variety of contemporary media, disclosing the presence 
of Others and the Self. This context of extension is the fertile ground for all creativity which 
includes a recreation of our own perceptions and, by reflection, a creative reinterpretation of 
other texts. In this sense, there is no end to creativity, since there is no final text.
The polycentric “history” is a directionless horizon wherein the present, past and future 
have no specific locations. One can take a temporal dimension from Renaissance texts and 
make that the dimension from which past and future horizons will overlap; one can search 
for the best constitutional defense in texts and find those texts stating what one is to do to-
morrow – overlapping of time awareness; or one can take a geocentric perspective and with 
all the technical apparatus wait for light waves to come from the past, wherein past-present-
future overlap, where present, expecting something from the future meets the past. What is 
important is that without ontologization of time, history has no direction, and indeed no 
specific temporal location – as awareness, nor does it have anything to do with spatial meta-
phor of inner and outer. As if historical awareness were an entity that goes through stages 
and can be “found” somewhere or sometime. Texts in libraries are signifying intentionalities 
that depict the world in accord with different awareness modalities. Only after we are aware 
of the ways of explicating the world, can we then check for the age of the paper, the hide, the 
stone, but even that will turn out to be “intentional”, i.e. the hide will reveal not its empirical 
presence but its “age” and therefore will be seen primarily as conscious phenomenon. One 
aspect remains to be disclosed. The polycentric history, does not offer some sort of final or 
ultimate unity, since the latter would be another perspective. Besides, no polycentric horizon 
can exhaust the awareness of the possibility of not yet available Others by any perspective.
Second aspect is the linguistic mediation deemed to be the unmediated medium. The 
latter is the ground of polylogical “dialogue”. The arguments, presented so far, do not deny 
the presence of language in communication; following the polycentric field of awareness, 
such a language is polylogical. Polylogue is an extension of dialogue. To speak is to speak to 
someone about something, some topic, issue, value, religion, scientific theory, and thus, at 
the outset, to be a dialogical partner. But we also know that as we perceive with the percep-
tions of Others who limit and extend our awareness, we also extend out dialogical engage-
ment into polylogical horizons. Without mentioning an author, I can say that gravity is now 
considered one among other forces in physics, but it also means that my dialogue is already 
polylogical and includes Newton as a copresence. We might even have our favorite polylogi-
cal partners across vast atemporal horizons. Any question I confront, I always consult the 
gigantic dialogues between Plato, Aristotle, the Arabic “doctors” and mix in the barefooted 
Socrates. After all, he defended philosophy to the death and became an example what it is 
to be dialogical and polylogical.
Fortunately, I can engage in such a polylogue, because language is the bearer of the way 
the others’ intentions “meant” events, disclosed issues, and the world that can never be 
doubted. At the outset it must be emphasized that dialogical world is intersubjective and is 
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one major way of resolving the protracted controversy between the proponents of the priority 
of individual over society and those who claim the supremacy of society. In the first instance, 
society is regarded as a sum of separate and indeed solipsistic individuals having solely antago-
nistic relationships, while in the second, the individual is a conjunction of social, events wherein 
society (at times interpreted in the form of institutions) is the defining dimension. Meanwhile, 
the composition of dialogue has to be understood as prior to and foundation of individualism 
and social holism. First, in dialogue the Other is not present as an object, a given entity, a mind 
inhabiting a body, but as a copresence engaged in a common venture. One speaks with someone 
about something, some topic, concern, subject matter, prior to regarding the other as a subject 
or an object. The commonality, here, is a subject matter in which WE are engaged, which WE 
confront, dispute, or agree upon. There is granted an orientation toward something with an 
orientation of a Self to the Other.
Second, the notion of sender-message-receiver must be modified away from a sequence of 
activity-passivity, where the sender acts, while the receiver accepts the message. Rather, it is a 
complex process of the establishment of both sender and receiver in a way that they both are 
contemporaneously active-passive as a mutual articulation and interrogation of a subject matter. 
Each partner founds the dialogue and in turn is founded by it. There is neither the priority of 
the individual, as the ultimate foundation, nor of the dialogical WE as the more encompassing. 
They are mutual and can be regarded analogously to a melody: each note is an individual and 
without it there would be no melody, but the melody also allows a note to have its say as posi-
tion in the melody. Change in either one is mutually change in the other.
Third, the dialogical partner is not merely the currently co-present other, but the others 
whose orientations toward the world, their perceptions of the topic, the subject matter, are 
equally co-present. The books I read, the conversations I had with others – perhaps long for-
gotten – comprise an extension of my perceptions and constitute a polycentric dialogical field. 
I perceive with the perceptions of the others, perceptions that contest, extend, and modify my 
own regard of a given subject matter. The same is true of my current dialogical partner; she 
too is founding of and founded by a polycentric field, and in our dialogue we mutually involve 
our polycentric awareness and hence extend our polycentric participation. This also constitutes 
the basis for transcendence of one’s own limitations and resultantly for openness and freedom. 
Without the other, and without our being co-present in a polycentric field, we would lack the 
transcending movement.
Fourth, polycentric polylogue defies the traditional notions of sequential history; poly-
logue constitutes a field of temporal depth wherein the “past” partners are not passive, but 
participate equally in articulating, challenging, and interrogating a specific issue, topic, or 
subject matter. Thus, it is quite normal to say, for example, that for the Egyptians humans 
were not categorized in terms of some presumed racial features, but in accordance with 
hierarchies of social positions and tasks. Of course, the focus of our polylogue is the hu-
man, while the others, the Egyptians, open and extend our perception by showing our own 
limitations and positionality. Here, their perceptions contest actively our own perceptions. 
At the polylogical level we are constantly decentered from our limitations even when we 
would reject the others perceptions of a given subject matter. Indeed, the very preoccupation 
with rejection, the efforts to demonstrate the inadequacy, the mistaken understanding, and 
downright error, shows the extraordinary credence and co-presence of the other.
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Fifth, the polylogical co-presence of the other not only decenters mutually absolute po-
sitionalities, but also constitutes the initial awareness of human situatedness as well as a 
reflective self-identification each through the other. It could be argued that polylogical field 
comprises the domain of inter-positional reflexivity such that one recognizes oneself only 
due to the difference from the other in modes of awareness of a subject matter. This is the 
transparency principle: I know myself to the extent that I reflect from the other, from the 
how she articulates a specific theme. I see myself through the different perceptions offered 
by the other that connect us by way of a common theme, task, subject matter, and allows 
us our recognition of our own positions. Another aspect of this morphology must be men-
tioned in order to avoid misunderstandings inherent in the efforts to objectify the other. 
Even if we engage in a dialogue about the other, we shall find that she cannot be understood 
apart from her perceptions of something, of some concerns inherent in her world. We shall 
understand her only to the extent that she is engaged in some task or concern, and thus is 
an aspect of our own polycentric field. After all, to discuss Virginia Woolf, is to discuss her 
views about something and thus introduce her as our polylogical partner. Even if we were 
so crude as to intrude into her “private feelings” we would still understand them as “feelings 
about something”. She, as well as we, are comprehensible only with respect to the world we 
address, contest, and share in our different ways.
3. Media and body
The level of polycentric awareness and polylogical communication we explicated is present 
concretely at the level of bodily activity which offers depth to the two dimensional awareness 
through texts and dialogue. Watching mass media, television, film, computers, we are present 
to a two dimensional phenomena, although we take for granted that what we experience are 
full bodied, three and even multidimensional world. Thus, to understand this media dimen-
sionality we must understand the way body is co-present in any communication. The intro-
duction of bodily presence require a minimal comprehension of the structuration of body in 
action, body as individual, and body as social. The investigations into the configurations of 
the dispositive cannot be understood seriously on the basis of a body sitting in front of a tele-
vision while the mind, as an added attraction, decodes and interprets the images. Moreover, 
this sort of understanding does not account for the body that is regarded as an individual 
and as socially interactive. This is to say, the traditional depictions of body as bio-chemical, 
as physiological, as psychosomatic give us anonymous, universal body whose description 
can subsume all bodies. Contrary to this, we must explicate the practical body that lives its 
orientations, activities, faces its tasks and is engaged with others in ventures grasped in direct 
action and interaction. How could one watch a film, a television program, or a video and not 
understand, indeed not be corporeally present, to the activities performed. Our task, then, 
is to delimit this body in action and its incorporation in perceptual-perceived body events. 
The incorporation, the coupling or the linkage to contemporary mass-media requires such 
understanding. Such understanding must fulfill the following requirements: First, body must 
possess a generality of activity that is not an expression or an embodiment of an ideal, but 
neither reduced to brute facticity. Second, it must constitute active self reflectivity as a tacit 
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recognition of “what I can do”. Third, it must be coextensive with and differentiated from 
the activities of others, allowing one to say “I can do that” or “I cannot do that”. In watching 
some performances, we recognize that indeed, we can jump, but not as high as the athlete, 
we can fight, but not as brutally as those bastards in wrestling rings. What we recognize, in 
brief, is a body comprising an entire system of performances, of abilities that are sufficiently 
general to be performed by others, but not in precisely the same way. Fourth, the active body 
as expressive and “ethical”. By the latter term we do not mean a set of norms, but a way of 
bodily being with others. A turning away from someone in need speaks its own language, 
holding someone in grief tells its own story; indeed, such actions may compact numerous 
stories, but we contend that all of them speak of our expressive relationships to others, speak 
of our ethos. This body that we are is the one that participates completely in everything that 
we perceive in mass media. Finally, fifth, a synesthetic body such that one perceptual field, 
such as vision, translates directly into other fields, such as hearing, touch, emotion, images, 
memories, and expectations. The following brief section offers an analysis of this lived body 
as it pertains to participation in mass media.
In this context, we shall not use the obsolete notions of communication as transmission 
of information, as dependent on cultural codes, and as secondary level reality that attempts 
to represent something. Rather, we shall move toward corporeal perception, participation, 
and intra-communication. Thus we hope to obtain a unity among differentiations of informa-
tion, media, and understanding-comportment. At the social level, the modes of awareness 
will be regarded as inter-corporeal and not just as observers of some images, discourses, 
present in media texts. If we regard communication as an operation linking minimally two 
systems which constantly reshuffle the informational content, then we could say that numer-
ous such systems constitute a complex differential process that has to be organized at another 
level, and done in a simpler way. This is accomplished by extended communicative process 
that follows technical media structures capable of transforming sequences and absences into 
presences, and drawing the “viewer-listener” into direct participation. Thus print, photog-
raphy, film, television, etc. each begin to duplicate and proliferate copies that link numerous 
populations. While mass printing performed this function initially, such function, as we 
shall see, required imaginary participation. With radio, film, television and most recently, 
Internet, smart phones there is an increasing concretion of participation and simplified com-
municative organization of linking, specifically temporal and spatial events irrespective of 
their geographic or historical positions. This becomes the window to an open domain of 
public exchange of opinions – at least in principle if not always in practice, and also changes 
structures of space and time and selectivity of relevance. Relevance may mean selectivity 
and coordination of themes and their immediate copying around the world society – with, 
of course, a very strong side effect of creating short term memories. The major reason, to be 
seen in greater detail subsequently, is the synchronic structure of the current media, such 
as television, Internet, smart phones. Allowing the linking of events to awareness without a 
distance. Thus, the very quality of awareness undergoes a radical, creative transformation.
Each dynamic extension of the awareness of the others, the extension of our polycentric 
horizon of awareness, carries an essential element of temporality. The reduction of commu-
nicative complexities through global selectivity of themes and connections became a neces-
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sity. Economic news – a theme that connects and involves the globe and us. Even without 
a specific thematic content, the possibility of encountering others from everywhere, has its 
own fascination, specifically with the central possibility to insert oneself any time in this link-
age, to be at the scene, and thus to be open to the world horizons through others, such that 
these horizons are more preeminently our reality than the horizons of the being with others 
of daily awareness. One can even claim that the linkages to the mass media are maintained 
not because of the information, but because our perceptions are completely intertwined with 
them. The millions who watched the first two steps on the moon certainly did not receive a 
rich content of information, yet were present at a world event at the same time, the various 
current events are known immediately. This is to say, it is not the cultural or informational 
quality that are at issue but the very relevance of our participation in events. The participa-
tion is, of course, mass mediated proliferation of copies that circle the globe. But the copies, 
giving us perspectives, is all we need for our current reality.
Whatever technology may be, what is relevant for our current deliberations is the level of 
technology that pertains to mass reproduction of the texts, perspectives and images such that 
there occurs a change in the ways of participating in such media. This change occurs in the 
fact of the absence of the original. In this sense, and as noted above, there is no original pres-
ence, and hence no representation; there is a mass proliferation of “copies” without the origi-
nal. Techniques of reproduction remove the copy from any context, given facticity, its world. 
This also indicates that there is no privileged access – by some elite – to the once lauded 
“original”. Even in arts, Mona Lisa (1503), Clint Eastwood, Charles Manson and Ludwig van 
Beethoven appear on placards, adds, tee shirts, toilet paper, magazine covers, and interwoven 
in digitalized caricatures. The viewer can either pass them by with a casual glance, or engage 
in casual shopping among them. Perhaps it could be said that such mass-mediating produc-
tion is super mallization of images found in Maxima and many other complexes; mallization 
does not respect any original or its space-time of origin. Here even the cherished metaphysics 
of authenticity, in the sense of historical origin, becomes redundant, and redundant becomes 
the notion of authorship. While the photograph, the cinema, the video and television have 
different modes of “audience” participation, they are indefinitely reproducible and present to 
“the people”. It is also to be noted that the definition of audience will have to be reevaluated. 
The lack of specific space-time, the synchronization, either blocks or abolishes the notion of 
authentication and the questions of socio-economic and ideological conditions of such series 
of copies. The boundaries between genuine and fraudulent, ethical or unethical, lose their 
value and indeed place into question any social authority that may still want to legitimate 
such distinctions. Examples abound in some documentaries showing the inferiority of the 
others to Anglo-Europeans via enlargement, slow-motion, and selectivity, creating a reality 
that legitimates the claims of mass media to be representation of truth.
It is a curious historical occurrence when the emergence of movies, as proliferation of 
multiple copies occurred, there was an effort to frame them in “theatres” with “classical” 
architectural styles, as if to block the death of the original and authentic. This effort “against 
the lower classes” wanted to lend copies a frame of authentic reality, a presence. It is as if to 
say, the masses will be elevated to a higher aesthetic truth, inaccessible to them by any other 
means. The movies, as “theatre” could not be placed in “low life” structures of housing. Thus 
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the illusion of placing movies in structures having Greco-Roman and Romantic airs. Was this 
an effort of the bourgeoise ideology to maintain a class position, even if the film medium was 
defying such a position? What is at issue, in this context, appears to be the ideological effort 
to maintain a bourgeois “authentic history”, in face of a medium that, when presented in the 
theatres, has no history. Thus, the selection of architectural styles of antiquity – to extend 
the claim to legitimation – is prevalent. We shall call this effort as permanence enhancement, 
in face of the emergence of total flux that has no fixed points of reference and hence every 
point may become, and indeed has become synchronous. The new filmic medium was, for 
a period, given an atmosphere of authenticity – but to no avail. After all, the current mass 
media – televisual, video, etc. – are present in every mobile home. As a copy of copies, the 
film is removed from any history, and acts as a self-reflective substitute of itself, thus con-
stituting an audience that cannot claim to have any authentic experience. These paradoxes 
could not be resolved; if one pretends that the grand palaces of movie theatres are extolling 
the permanence of high culture, what one shows within these palaces – the life of poor im-
migrants – defies the high culture. If one shows the Hollywood glamour films, dealing with 
high society, one exposes such society to multitude of copies and inauthenticity. At least, 
in a promissory way, “everybody can live this way”. Indeed, film, in many cases, comprised 
a mass medium that ridiculed the high society. Obviously, the copies of copies, were also 
continuous with consumerism, and thus all the high styles could be copied on the street. 
The glamorous style was as near as the shelves of cosmetics at department stores. We have 
here not only technological change, but also the public’s mode of awareness. The audience no 
longer travels to Hollywood for glamor; Hollywood is a given in the theatre next door. The 
theatre overcomes “reality” by making the copy a reality. As we shall see subsequently, there 
will be no other reality. The authority of the authentic “objectivity” becomes another copy on 
the newsreel. Regardless of economic status the proliferation of copies ushers an audio-visual 
equality at the level of perception. Each view, each perspective is open to all, and all at once.
Whoever is mass-mediated, is exposed to numerous and, until recently, anonymous view-
ers who could be exchanged equivalently – without a loss. Each viewer, reader, listener, is 
coupled with a power of judgment on which the extent of the proliferation of the copies 
will depend. The quantification of audiences is a result of this massification of the copies 
and hence judgments of their “quality”. We could even surmise that “cultural criticism” has 
its origin in this context. We are not concerned whether the copies of copies became insti-
tutionalized, whether they led or did not lead to political action instead of remaining mere 
entertainment for the masses, or whether they were propelled by, or themselves launched 
some economic forces; we are concerned with the very phenomena of mass-mediation that, 
in a final analysis, comprises various forms of the dispositive. The extrication of these phe-
nomena, inclusive of their extrication from private, sacral, high cultural loci may lead, and 
more likely has led to their restructuring as public and hence political; but this does not mean 
that they have originated the political. Yet on the other hand, they concretized the politi-
cal by giving it a tangible mass face. A film, even photography, can be duplicated without 
a loss and thus accessible for anyone. The faces of stars, as well as scoundrels, are flashed 
by photographic copies, as well as by filmic, televisual, and video means “everywhere” and 
“at once”. The images are shown not to be “seen through” as signifiers toward the signified, 
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but as given in themselves, events and realities as they are seen, but both as a perspective 
and from a perspective. The “from” is the camera’s position which becomes regarded as the 
position of the audience, and the perspective is the reflexive positioning of the entity in the 
mass-mediated material.
The positioning is discontinuous and requires recoupling. One scene, then the next one 
comprised of different events, then the hero enters this new scene, and has to be reconnected 
either verbally or through gestures in the scene with the other scenes. We shall speak of this 
phenomenon as inter-reflexivity wherein various gestures and discourses reflect one upon the 
others and equally reflect the audience such that the latter has, to speak minimally, a posi-
tion. This complex phenomenon of inter-reflexivity will be articulated subsequently. What is 
at the outset important is the removal of the audience from immediate participation and the 
perception of participation. Thus the great revolutionary heroes, losing their struggles against 
“authorities”, draw the revolutionary masses to gaze upon “the events” as given before its eyes. 
Here, the revolutionary awareness is one of looking but not acting. But then we can also sug-
gest that there is a reverse coupling, and reverse reflexivity whereby production of copies of 
mass mediated events, constitutes those events as equally copies – theories about mass me-
diated copies, philosophical debates about such theories, the objects to which the latter two 
wish to refer, are all proliferated copies. Any self-reflection and even self-criticism, is another 
copy in a world of pop-cultural critical studies. They too are commodified, perspectivised and 
publicized. If there were innocent hopes for the new technology, such as making the world 
accessible to critical evaluation and resultant correctives, it had to vanish with the constitu-
tion of reflexive logic of inclusion of the perceptions and perspectival positions into the very 
proliferation of copies after copies. We can sit in an ambulance or a taxi while remaining in 
the kitchen and watch the hilarious as well as the tragic come into our lives.
It has been contended that at the level of awareness, mass media, even as print, begins 
to break down the Euclidean notion of space. In reading about the events, we are aware of 
such events in a signitive fashion. We know what they mean, we understand them from the 
perspectives of others and are capable of filling either imaginatively or by memory the empty 
significations, the meant objects. It is our body positionality, our imaginations, memories, 
indeed the horizons that offer perceptual content. But with the gradual shift toward other 
media, such as radio, the perceptual filling thickens; we hear the other in our room, we hear 
her audial expressivity, we hear her laughter and – synesthetically – hear her smile and her 
expressive face. If we extend the technical media, say toward film, we thicken the perceptual 
presence of the other and – more importantly – I am bodily located as “here” in contrast to 
the other’s visible bodily “there”. Indeed, the film, television and smart phone media allow 
me to see events, vistas, facades of buildings from all perspectives. I can fill in his body posi-
tion where he holds the camera and hence see the way he sees. In addition, the others who 
confront him, also offer positions and thus other perspectives. What we have is a shifting 
multitude of bodily perspectives, each representing, positioning, and differentiating from 
one another. I can attune to their body performances and can enter the concrete vectors of 
their gestures, extended and varied by speech; I can see the angry, pensive, cold expressions 
across their faces and hear these expressions in their voices and total body comportments. 
Although the movie theater is designed to make us sit, or the television might allow us to lay 
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on a couch, they are also designed to draw us into the action – to fill in the body positions of 
the others, the actors not imaginatively or memorially, but by virtue of the “real bodies” on 
the screen. Obviously, we too are given a perspective of the invisible position of the camera. 
The latter, nonetheless, shifts to show what the others see, positions the others’ visions, and 
allows me to see from their positions. This is a peculiar phenomenon of reversal: I am here, 
and yet I see from there of their positions. I see from where they see. What is most important 
is the constitution of synchronicity. While I am watching “from here” and “now” I am given 
the perspective of the other synchronously. In this sense it is not an anonymous transposi-
tional, universal logos, but as it positions itself it positions both the audience and the actors 
as bodies synchronously. The latter allows corporeal self reflection, i.e. the constitution of 
oneself as a subject here, and as an object-subject there. We say “object-subject” because we 
see the other body, but the latter comprises – by way of camera angle and movement – our 
own seeing. We are suggesting that the new technologies, relevant for the understanding of 
mass media and the dispositive phenomenon, constitutive synchronicity.
Even with the filmic or television media, there is no presence of “reality”; rather, the 
shifting body perspectives constitute whatever the momentary focus of the perspective and/
or perspectives happens to be. If there is still a language of “reality”. it can only mean a mo-
mentary confluence of various perspectives, body orientations. Some may call this confluence 
“aperspectival”, or seeing something “from everywhere”, but these designations still depend 
on some permanent spatial object. In the filmic depictions, the object is rarely a thing, and 
what we get are facades of numerous things, none of which are given “from everywhere”. 
More likely the “focus” will be action and interaction, requiring at least some kinetic activities 
of the audiences: eye, head movements, attention, audial attunement, and even synesthetic 
“translation” from one to other sensorial registers. Although the filmic screen actors may 
be presenting some fictional characters, they, nonetheless, are on the way from diachronic 
toward synchronic time. Whenever the events may occur, for the audience, the actions on 
the screen are present in “flesh”. Indeed, the space of the filmic action stretches right before 
the audience, and the latter is incorporated in that space, but not a homogeneous space faced 
by a homogeneous, encompassing subject.
Perhaps such a subject was still available in print medium but in the filmic, and as we 
shall see, in the televisual and electronic media, such a subject is restructured by facades, 
shifting actions, and momentary foci. While the interplay of perspectival facades was mar-
ginal in the print media, since the latter had a narrative style, in the new technologies, the 
play of facades – reaching all the way to play of images – takes a central position. To use 
some of the current jargon, the center does not hold, and hence the marginalized become 
an all pervasive style in open, public communication. We could argue that this play and 
interplay comprises the dramaturgical character of filmic, and above all of televisual and 
electronic mass-media. This dramaturgical aspect is more important than the “informative” 
and ideological discourses. Indeed, the very dramaturgical interplay hardly needs language; 
the latter begins to play a subordinate role. At the filmic level we acquire a corporeal subject 
and subject-object corporeity as a phenomenon of a synchronic technosphere. The latter is 
all-pervasive and the economic system that dominates this pervasion is empowered to be 
global. Here, the classical modernity, still seeking to lend itself an aura of some permanence, 
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is finally dethroned from progress and history toward synchronic time. The presence of the 
encompassing technocratic impact overcomes the past and the future with direct desire to 
inhabit, participate in, and possess the mass mediated facades. This is to say, the tapes, the 
videocassettes, video cameras, personal computers, enclose the person in their own world. 
This system embodies the observer/participant in a decentered space and synchronic time in 
an initially seeming disembodied space, where any reference is intertextuality.
The new technologies, which we called synchronic, constitute as well a recoupling pro-
cesses that transform a reading culture into a audio-visual-kinetic culture. The direction 
of society as purposive system of self-reproduction can no longer depend on some ideo-
logical supra text for synchronisation. Rather, it depends more on the expressive-aesthetic 
synchronisation of gestural bodies as a language of kinetic audio-visuality. The electronic 
management of social interaction replaces decisionistic consciousness powers by software as 
recoupling processes, where the interplay of images, sounds, graphs, move from marginality 
to centrality. Here the language of expressivity, representing nothing, couples to the direct 
expressivity of the bodies of the participating audiences as if to impact the latter directly. It 
is to be noted that the language of “unconscious” stimulation also becomes redundant. After 
all, the recoupling is not only that we attach ourselves to the media, but it attaches itself to us 
through our expressive gestures and thus sends us to pretend that what we obtain from the 
mass media are the fulfillments of some unconscious desire. We contend that the recoupling 
is made possible by an incessant reproduction of all the audio-images and expressivities 
across all media, inclusive of the capital that is invested to grease the skids of this reproduc-
tion. This is to say, the value of capital depends on the reproduction of the images and their 
coupling with the audience, and the latter’s recoupling with the audio-images and corporeal 
gestures. This is proven over and over again in such banal situations as political campaigns. 
In order to engage in campaigns, one must invest money in the reproduction of copies; the 
reproduction of copies will bring in money. This is to say, the images must be capitalized. To 
speak in accordance with another theory, the semiotization of star images is capitalization, 
and capitalization of star images is semiotization. It is no accident that the most popular re-
cent president was an actor and chose the recoupling technical process, allowing him easier 
capitalization of images. What could be suggested that the public elects a person with whose 
politics the public would disagree and rejects a person with whose politics it would agree. 
The circulation of facades, perspectives, fragments that are coupled together, and recoupled 
with the audience, is the first novelty of synchronic techniques; the second consists of the 
audio-visual kinesthetic pervasion of expressive bodies, and the third may be the cyberneti-
cally directed recoupling of the two former with the addressed and engaged audience.
While Jean-François Lyotard’s (1984) analyses of the technologization emphasizes the 
problematic of epistemic access to the world, what we are showing, as the context for the 
dispositive, if not dispenses, at least diminishes such epistemic focus. Here we have to do not 
only with participatory corporeity that is recoupled to the media by the cybernetic manage-
ment and circulation of perspectives and facades, but also with the facticity that the world of 
“images” begins to be the sole world of postmodernity. This is to say, the shift from modern 
episteme to the synchronic technologies and recoupling processes is not a shift to a new 
episteme. The latter term has no resemblance to the already functioning dispositive. Where 
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the electronic recoupling techniques shift decision mechanisms from subject to software, the 
question of who knows what is redundant. Programs decide what images can be synchro-
nized with emotive effectivity and kinesthetic expressivity – and before the audience can 
make a judgement, the recoupling has accomplished its task. The principle of synchronization 
technologies, inclusive of recoupling processes of such technologies, are completely bound 
up with the audio-visual and kinesthetic sense of the body of the audience. There is no dis-
tance, there are no images of…, representations of…; there are events that have no signitive 
function to some “reality beyond”. This we say without a blush; the world is, after all said and 
done, a world of space and time and motion. But the synchronistic technology transforms the 
modern three dimensional space and sequential time, a space of locations and distances, into 
presences without distances, into the given with which we interact “right at home”. The space 
of concentrated metropolitan places of business, of commerce, of trade and transportation, 
is dispersed and yet made more accessible. The times are at an instant from every time. This 
is to say, space, time and motion have assumed radical transformations. Even the traditional 
distinction between audial and visual spaces has been subtended by expressive-kinetic and 
recoupling spaces that offer the directness of events. “Watch what happens to my counter-
parts headquarters” announces general Schwarzkopf during the desert storm briefing of mass 
media. After all, he did not say “watch the images of events 100 miles away”.
Conclusions
Emphasis must be placed on active body as interactive with mass media and as a field of 
inter-corporeal awareness. The latter ranges from the styles of walking, dressing, the rules of 
engagement with others, such as touching, distance, times of being somewhere, all the way 
to the entire social architectonic, including architecture. After all, the buildings are designed 
for movement, spaces, family, offices, monuments to royals, huge enterprises, all suggesting 
where, when and who one is in direct relationship to where others live and are. Our bodies, 
as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2014) argued, are the very structure of our architectural sur-
roundings. We do not know our world “in reality” from physics or physiology, but from our 
interaction, coextension with the world which we constantly build.
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Straipsnyje gvildenamas policentrinis potyris kaip kūrybos komunikacijos pagrin-
das su bet kuo, bet kada ir tuo lygmeniu, kuriuo bet kokia komunikacija suprantama 
kaip prasmė, kurianti kokį nors procesą. Dėl to tampa pasiekiami „Kiti“ iš kitų lai-
kų, aprašomų tekstuose, atveriančiuose komunikaciją per lingvistines ir kultūrines 
medijas. Skaitome Platono tekstus ir ginčijamės su juo teisingumo klausimu arba 
diskutuojame apie visatos pradžią su astronomais. Šie du lygmenys – policentrinis ir 
dialoginis – papildomi konkrečiais tyrinėjimais, skirtais kūnui kaip aktyviai ir inte-
raktyviai dimensijai, susietai su daugybe šiuolaikinių techninių medijų – pradedant 
filmais, televizija, internetu ir baigiant išmaniaisiais telefonais.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: komunikacija, kūrybiškumas, medijos, kūniškumas, interak-
tyvumas, Kiti.
